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N July 1, 1971, Colorado joined the ranks of an increasing
number of states which have adopted "comparative negligence" as a means of ascertaining liability and damages in
negligence cases. On that date, the provisions of Colorado's
Comparative Negligence Act' became effective and all legal
actions based upon torts occuring in Colorado on or after that
day are no longer subject to the common law contributory
negligence bar.
0

While the "comparative negligence" concept is certainly not
new, its introduction into Colorado practice has brought about
a relatively abrupt change. The purpose of this article is to
present an overview of the Colorado Comparative Negligence
Act of 1971, to examine its inner workings, and to consider the
ways in which selected areas of law may be affected by its
enactment. An appendix is included which contains several
forms designed to assist in the practical application of the Act
to specific cases.
I. BACKGROUND
Legislative enactments dealing with comparative negligence
in other American jurisdictions have varied in scope and content from extremely liberal applications of the comparative
negligence concept to greatly restricted interpretations of that
theory. To fully appreciate the impact of the Colorado Act,
some consideration of the evolution and present status of this
body of law is necessary.
A. Historical Development
The doctrine of contributory negligence was first pronounced in 1809 with the English case of Butterfield v. Forrester,2 wherein the plaintiff was denied recovery for injuries
Partner, Wolvington, Dash, Anderson, DeMoulin & Campbell, Denver,
Colorado; J.D., University of Denver College of Law, 1962.
1 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-2-14 (Supp. 1971).
2 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (1809).
*
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sustained in a horse riding accident because he was found to
be partially responsible for the mishap. From that case evolved
a legal precept which denied recovery to one who was even
slightly negligent. This idea found ready acceptance in England
and in the United States.
In a system that emphasized proprietary over social values
there seemed to be an element of justification in refusing to
allow recovery to one who himself was at fault. This was particularly true in cases where the plaintiff's conduct was as
culpable as the defendant's. However, where the level of culpability was disproportionate, the harshness of the doctrine
soon became apparent. As a consequence there has developed
increasing dissatisfaction among 20th century American legal3
scholars with the absolute defense of contributory negligence.
Courts have become more reluctant to rule that a plaintiff's
conduct was negligent as a matter of law, and juries are notoriously inclined to overlook the plaintiff's minimal negligence or
to make a haphazard reduction of plaintiff's damage in proportion to his fault, when necessary to avoid an unjust result.
It was this dissatisfaction which led to a number of attempts within the various states to find some substitute method
of dealing with cases where there existed negligence on the part
of both parties. The makeshift doctrine of "last clear chance,"
which evolved in England, 4 was adopted by a majority of jurisdictions in the United States in an attempt to soften the effect
of the strict rule of contributory negligence. Illinois and Kansas
at one time attempted to modify the harshness of contributory
negligence by classifying negligence into "degrees" and providing that if the plaintiff's negligence was "ordinary" while that
5
of the defendant was "gross" the plaintiff might recover. The
6
experiment was ultimately abandoned in both states.
In 1861, Georgia became the first state to seek a remedy for
the inequities of the contributory negligence bar by legislative
enactment when it adopted a number of regulations which permitted the application of comparative negligence principles in
tort claims. 7

In 1910, Mississippi enacted a "pure" comparative

2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 16.1 (1956); Pound, Comparative Negligence, 13 NACCA L.J 195 (1954); Prosser, Comparative
Negligence, 51 MICH. L. REV. 465 (1953); Turk, Comparative Negligence
on the March, 28 CHI-KENT L. REV. 189 (1950).
4
Davies v. Mann, 10 M. & W. 546, 152 Eng. Rep. 588 (1842).
5 Galena & Union R.R. v. Jacobs, 20 Ill. 478 (1858); Wichita & W.R.R. v.
Davis, 37 Kan. 743, 16 P. 78 (1887).
6 Lanark v. Daugherty, 153 Ill. 163, 38 N.E. 892 (1894); Chicago, K. &
N.R.R. v. Brown, 44 Kan. 384, 24 P. 497 (1890).
7 Goodrich, Origin of the Georgia Rule of Comparative Negligence and
Apportionment of Damages, 1940 GA. B.J. 174.
3
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negligence statute." This was followed in 1913 by the enactment
of the Nebraska Act which classifies the parties' negligence as
"slight" or "gross. ' In 1931, Wisconsin passed a statute which
permitted comparison of the plaintiff's and the defendant's
respective liabilities, but which barred recovery when both parties were equally at fault.1" South Dakota followed in 1941 with
a bill similar to that of Nebraska; 1 and Arkansas, in 1955, enacted a "pure" comparative negligence act much like Mississippi's, but repealed it in 1957 in favor of a statute which greatly
12
resembles the Wisconsin law.
To date 15 states have adopted some form of comparative
negligence and have thus eliminated contributory negligence
as a complete bar to tort recovery. They are: Arkansas, Georgia,
Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, Wisconsin, and, most recently, Colorado.
Various federal statutes have provided for a similar apportionment of damages according to fault, including the Federal
Employer's Liability Act, 13 the Jones Act, 14 and the Death on
the High Seas Act. 15 Also, many state railway and labor acts
contain provisions which reduce the awards payable to injured
workmen in proportion to their negligence in industrial mishaps.
B. Current Legislative Variations
As the above discussion indicates, comparative negligence
legislation in the United States has generally taken three forms.
Statutes in Nebraska and South Dakota typify the first variety
wherein the plaintiff's recovery is limited to situations in which
his negligence has been "slight" while that of the defendant
"gross," when compared. The determination of degree is, of
course, left to the jury. The net effect of these acts seems to
have been to revive the unsatisfactory experience at Illinois and
6
Kansas.'
s Shell & Bufkin, Comparative Negligence in Mississippi, 27 Miss. L.J. 105

(1956).
9 Johnson, Comparative Negligence - The Nebraska View, 36 NEB. L.
REV. 240 (1957).
lo See C. HEFT & C. HEFT, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE MANUAL § 3.570 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as HEFT]; Campbell, Ten Years of Comparative Negligence, 1941 Wis. L. REV. 289.
"See Comment, 7 S.D.L. REV. 114 (1962).
12 Rosenberg, Comparative Negligence in Arkansas: A "Before and After"
Survey, 13 AR. L. REV. 89 (1959).
1345 U.S.C. § 53 (1970).
14 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970).
15 Id. § 766.
16 Lanark v. Daugherty, 153 Ill. 163, 38 N.E. 892 (1894); Galena & Union
R.R. v. Jacobs, 20 Il. 478 (1858); Chicago K. & N.R.R. v. Brown, 44 Kan.
384, 24 P. 497 (1890); Wichita & W.R.R. v. Davis, 37 Kan. 743, 16 P.
78 (1887). See HEFT, §§ 3.340, 3.490.
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The second form of statutory enactment applies "pure" comparative negligence to the effect that a plaintiff may recover
his damages less the percentage of negligence attributable to
him without regard to a maximum percentage. Thus a plaintiff
who is adjudged to have been 90 percent responsible for his
own injuries may still recover 10 percent of his damages from
the party who is found to have been 10 percent at fault. Only
Mississippi presently employs this extreme apportionment
1
scheme. 7
The third variation is the "modified" or "equal to or greater
than" rule which reduces the plaintiff's recovery by the percentage of his own negligence and denies recovery if the plaintiff's negligence exceeds that of the defendant.1 8 This was the
form taken by the Wisconsin Act 19 and has been the most popular among those states which have recently enacted comparative
negligence statutes.
II.
Colorado's statute 20
Hawaii in 1969,21 which,
"modified" comparative

THE COLORADo ACT
was patterned after an act adopted in
in turn, was modeled after Wisconsin's
negligence legislation. Thus Wisconsin,
which has operated under its statute for a number of years,
17MIss. CODE ANN. § 1454 (1942).
's Pfankuah, Comparative Negligence v. Contributory Negligence, 1968

INS. L.J. 725.
' WIs. STAT. ANN.

§ 895.045 (1966) (The statute was originally enacted
in 1931). Wisconsin amended its statute in June 1971 to bar recovery by
a plaintiff only if plaintiff's negligence was greater than defendant's.
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (Supp. 1971).
20 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-2-14 (Supp. 1971). The actual text of the
Colorado Comparative Negligence Statute is as follows:
Negligence cases - comparative negligence as measure of damages. (1)
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in
any action by any person or his legal representative to recover
damages for negligence resulting in death or in injury to person
or property, if such negligence was not as great as the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought, but any
damages allowed shall be diminished in proportion to the
amount of negligence attributable to the person for whose injury, damage, or death recovery is made.
(2)
(a) In any action to subsection which (1) of this
secticn applies, the court in a nonjury trial, shall make findings
of fact or, in a jury trial, the jury shall return a special verdict
which shall state:
(b) The amount of damages which would have been
recoverable if there had been no contributory negligence; and
(c)
The degree of negligence of each party, expressed
as a percentage.
(3)
Upon the making of the finding of fact or the return
of a special verdict, as is required by subsection (2) of the section, the court shall reduce the amount of the verdict in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person for
whose injury, damage, or death recovery is made; but if the
said proportion is equal to or greater than the negligence of
the person against whom recovery is sought, then, in such event,
the court will enter a judgment for the defendant.
21 HAWAII REV. STAT. ch. 663 (1969).
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can be looked to by Colorado practitioners for interpretive
case law. Hawaii has, in the two years since passage of its act,
produced no appellate decisions of reference significance. In
attempting to utilize Wisconsin case law, however, one should
be aware that certain procedural systems such as a direct action
statute, non-unanimous jury verdicts, and common law contribution among tort-feasors are employed in Wisconsin but not in
Colorado. Also, Wisconsin has abolished all full or partial immunities including its guest statute.22 Fortunately, within the
next several years, there should be a body of law developing
23
in the various other states having the "modified" form.
The Colorado statute requires, as do the statutes in Hawaii
and Wisconsin, that the jury record percentage allocations on a
special verdict form. 24 The statute also requires that a jury
25
The trial
make a finding as to the total damages incurred.
to
reduce
computation
mathematical
the
judge then makes
damages by the extent of the plaintiff's percentage of negligence or dismisses the case against a particular defendant if the
2
plaintiff's negligence exceeds that defendant's allocable fault.
The highest court of Wisconsin has ruled that it is reversible error to inform the jury as to the operation of the statute
27
As a consequence, the
or the effect of its percentage findings.
know what effect, if
do
not
theoretically
jury
members of the
any, their percentages have on the amount awarded. Nor is the
jury informed that the plaintiff will not recover if his negligence is found to be equal to or greater than that of the de28
fendant.
These procedural differences should be borne in mind when considering
Wisconsin authorities. Permitted "direct action" and non-unanimous
jury verdicts probably have little effect. Contribution and abolishment
of immunities are considered elsewhere in this paper.
2-3Ark., Hawaii, Idaho, Me., Mass., N.H., Wis.
24 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-2-14 (Supp. 1971). Specific legislative intent
is expressed by the special verdict requirement. The jury's function is
clearly limited to special findings. There is obviously no necessity to
tell the jury the effect of their findings and it would seem violative of
the spirit of the clear legislative mandate to possibly prejudice their
function or encourage speculation by unneeded knowledge of judicial
implementation of the statute.

22

Id.
Id.
2T Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 268 Wis. 6,

25

26

66 N.W.2d 697 (1954)

(attempted reading of pleading which would also

inform jury of the effect of its findings); DeGroot v. Van Akkeren, 225

28

Wis. 105, 273 N.W. 725 (1937) (reading statute to jury). Arkansas has
no special verdict requirement, so that its procedure is not helpful to
Colorado practice.
See generally the discussion on why the jury is not to be informed of
the result of their special findings. HEFT § 7.40.
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As to the special verdict form itself, the Colorado statute
requires only an ultimate fact determination as to percentage
allocations and total damages incurred. The jury is not required
to list the types or degrees of negligence involved. Originally,
Wisconsin jurors were given interrogatories which required
them to decide whether litigants were negligent with regard to
such factors as lookout, speed, control, and yielding of right-ofway. 29 Because of a great deal of confusion which resulted
from these specific findings, Wisconsin changed its procedure
so at present there are usually no specific findings, but only an
ultimate fact determination whether the litigants' acts, undefined by detailed interrogatories, were causally connected to
30
the occurrence.
Appropriate jury instructions and special verdict forms have
been developed by the Colorado Supreme Court Civil Jury Instruction Committee and approved by the Colorado Supreme
Court. 3 1 Because the Colorado statute applies only to accidents
occurring on or after July 1, 1971, there will be a period of time
during which a dual system will be in force.
To summarize, the Colorado Comparative Negligence Act
has four basic features: (1) the comparison of negligence determines liability of the person against whom recovery is sought
since a plaintiff cannot recover unless his negligence is of a
lesser degree than the negligence of that person against whom
he seeks recovery; (2) a comparison of negligence also serves
the purpose of reducing damages in proportion to the causal
negligence of the person seeking recovery; (3) the jury theoretically does not know the results of its findings as in a
general verdict; and (4) the court applies the doctrine upon
facts found by the jury in terms of percentages of negligence
attributed to each person contributing to the injury for which
recovery is sought. Apparently this is so even though such
person may not be a party in the suit. These features also apply
to counterclaims, cross-claims, and third party claims by and
between defendants.
It is not the kind, character, or number of negligent acts that are compared, but rather the degree of causality attributable to the persons involved. Grana v. Summerford, 12 Wis. 2d 517, 107 N.W.2d 463 (1961).
Hence, detailed interrogatories really serve no purpose.
30 Baierl v. Hinshaw, 32 Wis. 2d 593, 146 N.W.2d 433 (1966). See the present form of special verdicts used in Wisconsin. HEFT § 8.20. By statute,
the more detailed form may still be used in that state on a voluntary
basis, or at the discretion of the trial court. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 270.27
(1966).
31 The instructions and forms were approved by the Colorado Supreme
Court on Jan. 28, 1972 and are included as an appendix to this article.
The Colorado Supreme Court has already ruled that the statute will not
be given retrospective effect. Heafer v. Denver-Boulder Bus Co., 489
P.2d 315 (Colo. 1971).
29
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III.
A.

APPLICATION OF THE STATUTE

One Plaintiff v. One Defendant

Application of the statute in this context is fairly simple.
Consider the following illustrative examples:
Example (1)
51% negligent
P
49% negligent
D
100%
Damages if there had been
$10,000
no contributory negligence
Defendant not liable.
Result:
Example (2)
P
D
Damages if there had been
no contributory negligence
Result:

Example (3)
P
D
Damages if there had been
no contributory negligence
Result:

49% negligent
51% negligent
100%
$10,000
Plaintiff r e c o v e r s
51% of his damages
or $5,100.
50% negligent
50% negligent
100%
$10,000
Defendant not liable.

It can be seen that what seems to be an anomaly exists
under the "modified" comparative negligence rule. If a plaintiff
is 50 percent negligent or more he recovers nothing, whereas if
the plaintiff is only 49 percent negligent as against a particular
defendant, he recovers 51 percent of his damages. For those
who would criticize this feature, however, it should be remembered that comparative negligence is a compromise amelioration
of strict contributory negligence, which denied recovery to a
plaintiff who was even 1 percent negligent, with retention of
the concept that one who is equally at fault should not be entitled to recover.
B.

One Plaintiff v. Multiple Defendants

When multiple defendants are joined, the question arises
as to whether the plaintiff's negligence is to be compared with
the negligent conduct of each defendant or with the defendants'
negligence as a unit. It appears clear from a reading of the
Colorado statute that the plaintiff's conduct is subject to comparison only with the actions of each defendant against whom
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recovery is sought rather than against the combined
of the defendants.3 2 This has been the Wisconsin
tion, 33 and, in point of fact, individual comparison
be the established procedure in all comparative
34
states except Arkansas.
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negligence
interpretaappears to
negligence

Under the Arkansas view, a plaintiff has been allowed to
compare his negligence with that of the sum negligence of the
defendants and thus to recover damages from a defendant
3
whose negligence was judged to be less than the plaintiff's.
This result seems not only to represent a strained construction
of the Arkansas Act, but appears to also seriously imperil the
effectiveness of the statute itself by allowing the plaintiff
to control the substantive result simply through procedural
joinder. With the orthodox Wisconsin interpretation, this latter
problem is avoided and the outcome is the same whether defendants are sued separately or as a unit.
The following examples are illustrative of the multiple defendant consideration under the Colorado statute:
Example (4)
P
DI
D2

Damages if there had been
no contributory negligence
Result:
Example (5)
P
D1
D2

Damages if there had been
no contributory negligence
Result:

10% negligent
5% negligent
85% negligent
1007,
$10,000
D 1 dismissed; P re-2
covers $9,000 from D .
45% negligent
40% negligent
15%. negligent
100%
$10,000
Neither D 1 or D 2 is
liable, because plaint if f' s negligence,

The Colorado statute provides that comparison is made with "the person
against whom recovery is sought." Had the legislature intended a group
comparison it could easily have made such provision. See discussion by
James Smith concerning interpretation of an identical Massachusetts
Comparative Negligence Statute: Smith, Comparative Negligence in
Massachusetts, 54 MASS. L.Q. 140, 145 (1969).
:13Schwenn v. Lcraine Hotel Co., 14 Wis. 2d 601, 111 N.W.2d 495 (1961);
Kirchen v. Tisler, 255 Wis. 208, 38 N.W.2d 514 (1949); Walker v. Kroger
Grocery & Baking Co., 214 Wis. 519, 252 N.W. 721 (1934).
:1457 AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 434 (1971).
35 Walton v. Tull, 234 Ark. 882, 356 S.W.2d 20 (1962).
32
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though not as great
as the combined negligence of defendants, was greater
than each of the defendant's individual
negligence.
Another question which arises under the comparative negligence act is that of the disposition of the absent tort-feasor
who either cannot be found or is not joined for litigation of the
dispute. The Colorado statute requires that the court's finding
of fact or the jury's special verdict state the degree of negligence of each party, expressed as a percentage. 36 The Wisconsin
special verdict form and the recently adopted Supreme Court
Instruction Committee verdict form require that all causal negligence be accounted for so that the allocations of negligence
of the involved parties total 100 percent. It therefore becomes
apparent that if the jury is to make an accurate apportionment
of negligent involvement in a multi-party accident case where
all parties are not joined, some accounting for the absent causative element must be made. This could easily be done by including an "other" category on the special verdict form.
This consideration is illustrated by the following example:
Example (6)
P
DI
D2
Phantom or immune D
(party involved in collision
but could not be found or
joined in lawsuit)

10% negligent
9% negligent
11% negligent

70% negligent
100%

Damages if there had been
no contributory negligence
Result:

$10,000
D 1 dismissed; P re- 2
covers $9,000 from D .
The example seems somewhat harsh on D 2 . However, in
defense of this apparently inequitable result, it may be positively stated that the defendant's negligence was a proximate
cause of the plaintiff's injury and the plaintiff's negligence was
of a lesser degree. The same seemingly harsh result obtained
prior to comparative negligence when only one of several negligent parties was sued.-7 Plaintiff could proceed to judgment
against both as a unit, against each separately, or against only
36

COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-2-14 (Supp. 1971).

37

The reason for nonjoinder of defendants may be immunity, insolvency,
unavailability, or plaintiff's choice. See generally W. PROSSER, LAW OF
TORTS §§ 46, 47 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
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one if desired. Although plaintiff could have two separate judgments, he could have but one satisfaction .3 The only change
with the advent of comparative negligence is that strict contributory negligence is now abrogated and plaintiff's negligence
is compared with that of the defendant against whom he
proceeds.
1. Multiple Defendants - Agency
Where an agency or quasi-agency relationship exists between defendants joined in an action, with one defendant vicariously liable only by reason of the relationship, defendants are
considered as a unit for the comparison with plaintiff's conduct. 39 This is the necessary result because there is really only
the agent's conduct to consider. If the principal is guilty of
negligent conduct apart from his agent, then each would be
compared with plaintiff's conduct, with the principal also being
40
vicariously responsible for his agent's neglect.
2. Multiple Defendants - Contribution
As has been observed, where there are multiple defendants,
the sum of their negligence is not compared to the plaintiff's
negligence, except when defendants are or may be deemed to
be acting as agents for each other. The jury makes the determination of the percentage of fault on the part of each party,
and percentages of fault on the part of individual defendants
may differ markedly.
It would seem that if a determination and apportionment
of damages based upon the degree of negligence attributable to
each party is to be made, then the amount each defendant will
actually pay should be based on those same percentage determinations. However, this would amount to "contribution" between joint, concurrent or successive tort-feasors and such is
not permitted in Colorado. 41 The reason for refusing contribution in this situation is largely historical and developed out of
situations involving "intentional" torts as distinguished from
matters of mere inadvertence. 42 As with the concept of strict
contributory negligence, if the parties are in pari delicto, the
law grants no relief but leaves the parties as it finds them.
38 Id. at § 47.
39 COLO. JURY INST. 8:1-7.

It is the court that groups parties together for the comparison, if applicable. It is the jury's function only to find course and scope of employment, if that is disputed, and the percentage of causal negligence
of the agent/employee and possibly also the principal if he is guilty
of conduct separate from his agent/employee.
41 Hamm v. Thompson, 143 Colo. 298, 304, 353 P.2d 73, 76 (1960).
40

42

PRossER § 50.
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Such is the present state of law in Colorado today and the
statute on its face does not alter it.
Wisconsin has recently adopted, by judicial decision, a
"comparative contribution" rule.43 It provides that each defendant should bear that portion of the amount owed to the
plaintiff in the ratio of his negligence to the total amount of
the negligence found attributable to defendants liable to the
plaintiff. 44 It would seem that some form of contribution or
comparative contribution would be a logical extension to the
law of comparative negligence in Colorado. This, together with
the liberal joinder rules provided by existing rules of procedure, would make a fair and relatively uncomplicated assignment of the loss. Until that occurs, however, no contribution
between defendants as to a particular plaintiff's loss will be
permitted. Without contribution, those defendants who are
found to have been individually at fault to a greater extent
than the plaintiff will be held jointly and severally responsible
for such damage regardless of their individual proportions of
fault.
3. Multiple Defendants- Res Judicata
In situations where the plaintiff is unable or unwilling to
join all parties potentially responsible for the claimed injury,
a question arises as to the res judicata effect of a jury determination against only those defendants joined in the suit.
We have observed that the jury is required to assign a percentage of fault to parties involved in the claimed injury at
least so far as such parties are before the court in a particular
action. If two of three party defendants are joined, the relative
proportion of the absent defendant will be determined. The
questions then become whether this determination would be
binding on the plaintiff in a subsequent action against that
absent defendant and whether such determination would be
binding upon the absent defendant in a subsequent determination.
The law relating to res judicata is well-established in this
state and it does not appear that the comparative negligence
statute will substantially affect existing precedents. 45 Generally, a plaintiff who sues one of two or more joint tort-feasors
and is unsuccessful in his effort, is not precluded or bound by
the previous result in a subsequent action against one who
43

Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962).

44 Id. at 2, 114 N.W.2d at 107.
45 City of Westminster v. Church,

167 Colo. 1, 445 P.2d 52 (1968).
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was not a party to the first suit.46 Similarly, a defendant subsequently joined in an action is not bound by a judgment to
which he was not a party, and he is entitled to a complete and
separate determination of relative fault.47 This would appear to
create the opportunity for successive individual lawsuits with
varying results, but the same is true under the present system.
A plaintiff is entitled to but one satisfaction and can enforce
a judgment only against the individual defendant against whom
it was obtained. There are therefore no additional problems
presented.
C. Multiple Plaintiffs
Where multiple plaintiffs bring an action jointly, the principles previously discussed will apply to each plaintiff. Ordinarily, each plaintiff's conduct is considered and compared on
an individual basis. There will be relationships, however, which
48
will bring about group-plaintiff comparisons.
1. Multiple Plaintiffs- Death Statute
In death cases prior to comparative negligence, contributory negligence on the part of either the party claiming dam49
It
ages or of the decedent himself was a bar to recovery.
would appear that consideration of negligent conduct by both
beneficiary and decedent will remain under the comparative
negligence statute in that it provides that any damages allowed
shall be diminished "in proportion to the amount of negligence
attributable to the person for whose injury, damage, or death
recovery is made." 50 By this provision, a beneficiary would
be a "person for whose damage recovery is made," and the
decedent would be "the person for whose death recovery is
made." The recently approved Pattern Jury Instructions on
comparative negligence retain the consideration of negligence
by both decedent and beneficiary. 51
With this feature of Colorado law remaining, the next
question becomes whether the negligent actions of the decedent
and beneficiary, if both were causally negligent, are to be con46 The test of -res judicata is set out in Newby v. Bock, 120 Colo. 454, 210

P.2d 986 (1949): "For the plea to be a complete defense, there must be
'identity of subject matter, identity of cause of action, identity of persons
to the action and identity of capacity in the persons for or against whom
the claim is made.' "
47 46 AM. JuR. 2D Judgments § 519 (1969). But see Presser v. United States,
1963).
218 F. Supp. 108, 111 (S.D. Ill.
48 See notes 51, 53, 54, 55 infra.
49 COLO. JuRY INST. 10: 1, 2 and cases cited therein. See recently approved
changes in appendix p. 492 infra.
50 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-2-14 (Supp. 1971).
51See revised COLO. JURY INST. 10: 1, 2, appendix P. 500 infra.
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sidered individually with each defendant or whether their conduct is to be lumped together for comparison. This question
has been answered by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in West52
ern Casualty & Surety Co. v. Dairyland Mutual Insurance Co.,
which held that a widow's negligence would have to be added
to that of the decedent in making a statutory comparison with
the negligence of the defendant.
It seems obvious that if only the decedent or the beneficiary is negligent, then it is only his negligence which is compared with the defendant's negligent conduct. Where only one
of several beneficiaries is negligent, his negligence is compared
with that of the defendant for a determination of that beneficiary's recovery of his proportionate share of the damages re53
sulting from the decedent's death.
The following example is illustrative of the application of
the comparative negligence statute in death cases:
Example.. (7)
P1 (beneficiary)
P 2 (beneficiary)
Decedent
D1

6%
30%
7%
8%

D 249%

negligent
negligent
negligent
negligent
negligent

100%
Damages if there had been
no contributory negligence:

P' $10,000

P2 $10,000
D1 dismissed (b ecause P' and decedent's combined negligence exceeds that
of D'); P 1 recovers
2
$8,700 from D ; p2
recovers $7,300 from
D 22. If negligence of
P is imputable54 to
decedent or P1 , the
result would be D 1
dismissed; P 1 recovers $5,700 from D 2 ;
P 2 recovers $ 6,3 0 0
from D 2 .
2. Multiple Plaintiffs- Loss of Consortium, Loss of Services and Medical Expenses
It would appear that consortium loss claims will be conResult:

52
53
54

273 Wis. 349, 77 N.W.2d 599 (1956); See also Reber v. Hanson, 260 Wis.
632, 51 N.W.2d 205 (1952).
Happy Valley Farms v. Wilson, 192 Ga. 830, 16 S.E.2d 270 (1941); Hansberry v. Dunn, 230 Wis. 626, 284 N.W. 556 (1939).
See Multiple Plaintiffs - Imputed Contributory Negligence, p. 482 inlra.
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sidered in a manner similar to death claims, since loss of consortium is essentially derivative in nature. Where only the injured spouse is negligent, that negligence is used as the basis
for comparison on a consortium claim. If both the injured
spouse and the party entitled to services are causally negligent,
their combined negligence is considered as a unit for comparison
with the conduct of the individual defendants. 55 This same basis
would be used in parent/child claims for loss of services and
56
medical expenses.
3. Multiple Plaintiffs- Imputed Contributory Negligence
Under the present state of the law, certain persons may
be found contributorily negligent by imputation of another's
conduct to them; these include joint venturers, heads of household who allow household members to use the "family car,"
employers, and joint owners of automobiles who are passengers
in their own vehicles.5 7 This is so because the law presumes
some degree of inherent right of control. Comparative negligence will not change this aspect of the law, but the effect of
any imputed contributory negligence will be to bring about a
comparison and reduction of damages, or the "50 percent bar,"
according to the degree of culpability attributable to the party
whose conduct is to be imputed. 58
III. THE

RELATIONSHIP OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE

TO OTHER AREAS OF COLORADO TORT LAW

A. Differing Standards of Care
An important question which might arise under the statute
concerns the effect upon the negligence comparison process of
a differing standard of care between the plaintiff and defendant.
Although the courts have consistently stated that the standard
of care is always reasonable care under the circumstances, 59 on
occasion a defendant, such as a common carrier, will be held
to the "highest degree" of care.6 0 Jury instructions in Wisconsin recognize different levels or standards of care in such cases
without describing how this differentiation should affect apportionment.6 1
55 As in death cases, it is the court that groups parties together for the
comparison, if applicable, rather than a jury function. See revised
COLO. JURY INST. 9:16, appendix p. 492 infra.
56 See revised COLO. JURY INST. 9: 17, appendix P. 493 infra.
57 COLO. JURY INST. 11:23 and cases cited therein.
58 See Example (7), p. 481 supra.
59 See generally, PROSSER § 72.

INST. 12: 23.
,' WIS. JURY INST. Civil No. 1532. But see Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1,
(0 COLO. JURY

114 N.W.2d 105 (1962), wherein the concept of "gross negligence" was
abolished.
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Apportionment might reasonably be made by comparing
the degree of relative deviation by each party from his own
standard of care. As an example, in a personal injury suit involving an 8-year-old plaintiff pedestrian and an adult defendant automobile driver, the acts of the child would be compared with others of his age, intelligence, and experience, and
the degree of any deviation from this standard would then be
compared with the degree of deviation of the adult driver
from his standard of care. 2 While it appears that a jury might
have difficulty in attempting to assign percentages of fault
where there are two varying standards of care applicable, in an
ultimate fact verdict jurisdiction such as Colorado, weight to
be given to a particular type of negligent conduct can be left to
jury determination upon proper instruction of the legal standard involved.6 3 Comparative negligence, therefore, actually effects no change from existing practice in this regard.
B. Differing Degrees of Negligence
An additional problem presents itself when the parties to a
tort action have each been negligent to a different degree, as in
cases arising under the Colorado Guest Statute, wherein a defendant's liability is predicated upon a finding of "willful and
wanton" negligence. 64 In those circumstances, the Colorado
Supreme Court has distinguished this type of conduct from
ordinary negligence.6 5 "Willful and wanton" or "reckless" acts
have been grouped together as an aggravated form of negligence, differing in quality rather than in degree from ordinary
lack of care. There presently exists an imposing body of law
which holds that contributory negligence is not a defense to
willful, wanton, or reckless conduct unless such contributory
negligence was also willful, wanton, and reckless.66 It is unclear whether contributory negligence is a defense to willful,
wanton, or reckless conduct in this jurisdiction, since Colorado
pattern jury instruction are silent on the question and the
67
applicable cases are old and somewhat vague.
Until recently, Wisconsin did not compare negligence where
9:4.
63 See generally CoLo. JURY INST., with Supreme Court Jury Instruction
Committee amendments for comparative negligence cases in appendix
P. 492 infra.
64
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-9-1 (1963).
65 COLO. JURY INST. 11: 16 and cases annotated therein.
66 P ossM § 65.
67 Denver & R.G.R.R. v. Spencer, 25 Colo. 9, 52 P. 211 (1898); Chicago
R.I. & Pac. R.R. v. Nuney, 19 Colo. 36, 34 P. 288 (1893); Missouri Pac.
R.R. v. Atkinson, 23 Colo. App. 357, 129 P. 566 (1913).
62 COLO. JuRY INST.
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each of the parties was found to have been negligent to a
different degree. Thus plaintiff's ordinary negligence, for example, was not compared to defendant's gross negligence. However, the Wisconsin Supreme Court now permits such a comparison to be made and although it has provided no guidelines
to facilitate the comparison, it seems to retain in theory at
68
least, the distinction in degree.
Analogous to this problem is the question of whether "active" and "passive" negligence should be compared.69 In this
regard the Wisconsin Supreme Court has reversed a trial court
which permitted a verdict form to be submitted to a jury comparing the passive negligence of co-guests with that of the
70
host.
As to standards of care, qualities and kinds of negligence,
it would seem then that the uncertainty which now exists will
probably remain, leaving ultimate weight and negligence comparison to jury determination.
C. Assumption of Risk and Last Clear Chance
Among Colorado's trial bar, there will certainly be an
interest in the probable influence of the comparative negligence
statute on the well-known doctrines of assumption of risk and
last clear chance. The former doctrine would seem to remain
unaltered;7'1 that is, assumption of risk by a plaintiff will still
be an absolute defense. This is so primarily because the theory
behind it had its origin in contract and was but a form of
consent.7 2 It can thus be applied without any form of fault.
When both contributory negligence and assumption of risk
barred recovery, the distinction was academic and there were
often factual situations wherein assumption of risk and contributory negligence were one and the same. 73 But when comparative negligence becomes the rule, the distinction between
assumption of risk and contributory negligence becomes extremely important.
The accepted Colorado definition of assumption of risk
is as follows: "A person assumes the risk of injury or damage
resulting from the negligence of another if he voluntarily and
unreasonably exposes himself to injury or damage with
68

Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962).
(, See discussion of "active/passive" negligence considerations in indemnity, p. 489 infra.
70 Vroman v. Kempe, 34 Wis. 2d 680, 150 N.W.2d 423 (1967).
71 The statute makes no reference to assumption of risk.
72 PROSSER
73 Id.

§

68.
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knowledge and appreciation of the danger and risk involved." 74
As defined, assumption of risk is not necessarily incompatible
with comparative, contributory negligence. 75 However, Wisconsin has blended the two defenses into one so that assump76
tion of risk as a separate legal entity has been abolished.
Nevertheless it would seem that Colorado's rather clear and
orthodox definition of assumption of risk makes the defense a
distinctly different consideration from contributory negligence
and applies only where plaintiff's assumption was "unreasonable." Without clear legislative intent, the concept should not
be abolished for the sake of expediency. The recently adopted
revisions of the Colorado Pattern Jury Instructions have re77
tained assumption of risk in a comparative negligence context.
As to the doctrine of last clear chance, it developed as a
rule designed to soften the harsh effect of contributory negligence. 78 Thus, it would seem that the necessity for such a rule
is eliminated when comparative negligence becomes applicable.
Looking to other comparative negligence states for interpretive
insight, it may be seen that Nebraska has retained the doctrine of last clear chance and has thereby virtually eliminated
the slight/gross negligence standards of comparison, so as to
apply last clear chance in all cases unless the plaintiff's negligence was active and continuing until the very moment of the
accident. 79 South Dakota has also retained the doctrine of last
clear chance, and has determined it to be compatible with comparative negligence.80 Arkansas, Mississippi, Maine, and Wisconsin have apparently abrogated the last clear chance rule
and simply use the apportionment, comparison, and reduction
features of their comparative negligence statutes in its stead.,
No reason seems to exist for preserving last clear chance
74 COLO. JURY INST.

9: 21.

Hass v. Kessell, 245 Ark. 361, 432 S.W.2d 842 (1968); Wade v. Roberts,
118 Ga. App. 284, 163 S.E.2d 343 (1968); Saxton v. Rose, 201 Miss. 814,
29 So. 2d 646 (1947); Brackman v. Brackman, 169 Neb. 650, 100 N.W.2d
774 (1960).
76 Gilson v. Drees Bros., 19 Wis. 2d 252, 120 N.W.2d 63 (1963).
77 The Supreme Court Jury Instruction Committee has not deleted as75

sumption of risk from revised Instructions in comparative negligence

cases.
78 MacIntyre, The Rationale of Last Clear Chance, 53 HARv. L. REv. 1225
(1940).
79 Bezdek v. Patrick, 120 Neb. 522, 103 N.W.2d 318 (1960).
80 Vlack v. Wyman, 78 S.D. 504, 104 N.W.2d 817 (1960).
81 Reppeto v. Raymond. 172 F. Supp. 786 (W.D. Ark. 1959); Cusman v.
Perkins, 245 A.2d 846 (Me. 1968); Switzer v. Detroit Inv. Co., 188 Wis.
330, 206 N.W. 407 (1925); Price, Applicability of the Last Clear Chance
Doctrine in Mississippi, 29 Miss. L.J. 247 (1958); Rosenberg, Comparative Negligence in Arkansas: A "Before and After" Survey, 12 ARK. L.
REv. 89 (1959).
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either under a proximate cause consideration or a mitigation
of contributory negligence theory. Even prior to comparative
negligence, the courts were hesitant to apply the doctrine except in clearly applicable cases, and it now appears that this
doctrine will be one of the first laid to rest. The revised Colorado Pattern Jury Instructions eliminate last clear chance
instructions in actions where comparative negligence is
82
applicable.
D.

Res Ipsa Loquitur
The elements of res ipsa loquitur are generally acknowledged to be: (1) under the facts and circumstances the type
of accident does not occur in the absence of negligence; (2)
the injury must be caused by an agency or instrumentality
within the exclusive control of the defendant; and (3) the injury must not have been due to any voluntary action or contributory action on the part of the plaintiff.83 When these elements are established, an inference or presumption arises that
the negligence must have been that of the defendant and the
doctrine operates as a substitute for actual proof of negligence.
In Wisconsin, in the case of Turk v. H.C. Prange, Co.,84 the
court held that the third element was dispensed with by operation of the comparative negligence statute. Thus, in Wisconsin
at least, the negligence of the plaintiff does not bar applicaion of res ipsa loquitur in a comparative negligence context,
but is considered in the overall comparison.
The Colorado Pattern Jury Instruction on res ipsa loquitur
does not include freedom from contributory negligence as an
element necessary to the application of the doctrine.8 5 The instruction does speak of "exclusive" control, however, and if a
plaintiff is deemed partially in control of the particular instrumentality, then his conduct may become a consideration
in determining the statute's applicability.
E. Proximate Cause
Considerations of proximate cause under comparative negligence should theoretically remain as they existed before the
Act. Colorado Pattern Jury Instructions on causation need not
be changed,8 6 and the Supreme Court Pattern Jury Instruction Committee's revisions do not incorporate such a change.
82
83
84
85
86

Revised COLO. JURY INST. 9:18, appendix P. 493 infra.
PROSSER § 39; 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2509 (1st ed. 1905).
18 Wis. 2d 547, 119 N.W.2d 365 (1963). See also Welch v. Neisius, 35
Wis. 2d 682, 151 N.W.2d 735 (1967).
CoLo. JURY INST. 9:14.
COLO. JURY INST. 9:24-28.
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A comparative negligence statute does not eliminate contributory negligence as a defense in a negligence action, but
rather merely modifies the common law rule to the extent
that contributory negligence is no longer an inexorable bar
to recovery in every case. Hence the same causal connection
must be shown in a comparative negligence context as would
have been necessary if common law contributory negligence
had been in effect.
F. Intentional Torts and Strict Liability
As for tort actions based on intentional acts, the comparative negligence statute will simply not operate.87 Nor will it
generally apply where strict liability governs. The latter is
actually outside a consideration of contributory negligence because negligent conduct by either party is not the basis for
s8
recovery. However, in the Wisconsin case of Dippel v. Sciano,
section 402A of the Restatement of Torts (Second) was deemed
applicable notwithstanding comparative negligence, and the
rule of strict liability in tort was adopted for product liability
cases. Commenting that the defense of contributory negligence
was nonetheless available to the seller, the court likened the
basis of the seller's liability to negligence per se and per89
mitted the defense.
IV.

PLEADING AND EVALUATION UNDER THE STATUTE

The style and substance of pleading a complaint need not
materially change under the statute. Since comparative negligence is but a statutory refinement of the affirmative defense
of contributory negligence, plaintiff need not plead freedom
from, or a lesser degree of negligence than defendant to state
a claim. 90 There should, therefore, be no change in the rule
that a claiming party need not anticipate a defense in his
pleading. 91
Contributory negligence under the comparative negligence
statute is an "affirmative defense." Its difference from the previous contributory negligence rule has been noted as operating
either to reduce plaintiff's damages, or, if of appropriate degree,
to completely bar the plaintiff's action. This difference should be
reflected in defendant's answer.
87

F.

HARPER

&F.

JAMES,

supra note 3 § 22.6;

PRossER

§ 65.

88 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).

Id. at 452, 155 N.W.2d at 64.
90 Stevens v. Strauss, 147 Colo. 547, 364 P.2d 382 (1961); Schwenn v. Loraine Hotel Co., 14 Wis. 2d 601, 111 N.W.2d 495 (1961).
91 Davis v. Bonebrake, 135 Colo. 506, 313 P.2d 982 (1957).
89

VOL. 48

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

2
Notice pleading is sufficient in Colorado,1 and simplicity of
93
pleading is preferred under the rules. Since the comparative
negligence defense is based upon statute, an allegation that plaintiff was contributorily negligent together with an incorporation
of the statute by reference, should adequately state all features
94
of the defense.
Evaluations of claims under the statute will change less
materially than might be thought. Some degree of percentage
allocation to relative fault was being made in most evaluations
anyway. Very seldom were even undisputed liability cases absolute. Therefore, the same method employed in the special jury
verdict would probably be a useful technique in evaluating a liability case. After a reasonable factual investigation, a determination should be possible as to relative percentages of fault attributable to the involved parties. From a knowledge of the
nature and extent of injury, a determination of damages can be
approximated, and chances for dismissal based on the estimated
degree of plaintiff's negligence, or the potential amount of any
judgment can be calculated.
It seems that for years jurors have been applying a degree
of comparative negligence to their awards in liability cases anyway. Now that the thought processes of the jury are harnessed
be less difficult
and directed along specified lines, results should 95
facilitated.
to predict and the evaluation process

Wisconsin attorneys have developed a table of "suggested
comparisons" of negligence between drivers in ordinary motor
96
That table is as follows:
vehicle cases.
"SUGGESTED

COMPARISONS OF NEGLIGENCE BETWEEN

DRIVERS IN ORDINARY CASES"

Rear End

Defendant
100%

Plaintiff

92 Bridges v. Ingram, 122 Colo. 501, 223 P.2d 1051 (1950).
93 "A party shall state in short and plain terms his defenses to each claim

asserted." COLO. R. Civ. P. 8(b). "Each averment of a pleading shall
be simple, concise and direct." CoLo. R. Civ. P. 8(e) (1). See Ripple &
Howe, Inc., v. Fensten, 156 Colo. 322, 399 P.2d 97 (1965).
94 COLO. R. Civ. P. 9 (i) provides that when pleading a statute of Colorado,
it need not be set forth at length but can be referred to by appropriate
designation or otherwise identified, and the court will take judicial
notice thereof. See 3 V. DITrMAN, COLORADO PRACTICE § 9.6 at 261 (1965).
Simple comparative negligence pleading forms are set forth in HEFT,
app. at 20-47.
1968
95Pfankuch, Comparative Negligence v. Contributory Negligence,
INS. L.J. 725; Note, Comparative Negligence-A Survey of the Arkansas Experience, 22 ARK. L. REv. 692 (1969).
It should be observed that this table is based upon
96 HEFT § 450 (1971).
Wisconsin experience where "direct action" against insurance companies

is permitted.
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Intersection
Uncontrolled
Stop Sign
Signal Light
Left Turn
Oncoming
Failure to Yield
Improper Passing
Wrong Side of Road
Improper Turn

60%
85%90%

40%
15%
10%

80%
70%
75%
90%
80%

20%
30%
25%
10%
20%

While this type of table may be helpful, each case will obviously
differ as to its own facts, '7 so that any sort of mechanical analysis
will be of limited value.
Where the liability of one of several defendants is based
upon negligence which was "secondary" and "passive," whereas
the other defendant or defendants' negligence was "active," "primary" and "proximate," a right of indemnity between defendants
arises which permits recovery not only for any amount the
secondary/passive defendant was obligated to pay plaintiff, but
also for defense expenditures incurred in his defense of the plaintiff's action98 It is unlikely that this doctrine will change through
comparative negligence. Even now, for the doctrine to apply, one
party's negligence must be different in kind. If that difference
in the quality of conduct exists, full reimbursement results. If
the difference in kinds of negligence does not exist, then the
doctrine is inapplicable because at that point the recovery
would be one of "contribution," which Colorado courts do not
allow.11 There should therefore be no change in the concept
of indemnity other than the possibility of increased usage resulting from an increase in the number of multiple-party
actions.
The statute may alter present patterns of pleading and
evaluation in a variety of other ways. For example, a claiming
party in a counterclaim, cross-claim or third party claim is treated
as a plaintiff and thus he is subject to the comparative negligence
considerations previously discussed. For this reason the special
For example, defendants are not always 100% negligent in rear-end
accident cases. Gaulin v. Templin, 162 Colo. 55, 424 P.2d 377 (1967);
Hickman v. Hock, 486 P.2d 442 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971) (not selected for
official publication); Varcoe v. Form & Pour Co., 480 P.2d 591 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1971) (not selected for official publication).
98Jacobson v. Dahlberg, 108 Colo. 42, 464 P.2d 298 (1970); Parrish v.
DeRemer, 117 Colo. 256, 187 P.2d 597 (1947); Otis Elevator Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 95 Colo. 99, 33 P.2d 974 (1934); Colorado & S. Ry. v.
Western Light & Power Co., 73 Colo. 107, 214 P. 30 (1923).
99 Hamm v. Thompson, 143 Colo. 298, 353 P.2d 73 (1960).
97
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verdict arrangement with judicial implementation of the result
should greatly simplify a jury trial involving counterclaims,
cross-claims or third party claims.
Comparative negligence may also encourage more ancillary
actions of this nature. Defendants who are only slightly negligent
may be more inclined to counterclaim if joined by a potentially
more negligent plaintiff or to cross-claim when joined with more
negligent co-defendants. Cross-claims and third party actions
may become more prevalent as defense devices where actual
percentages of negligent involvement are being determined by
a jury with implementation by the court.
Additionally, it would seem that courts will become considerably more reluctant to direct a verdict based on the contributory negligence of the plaintiff. Before comparative negligence, the test was whether reasonable minds could differ as to
whether plaintiff was contributorily negligent in the cause of
plaintiff's claimed injury. 100 Under comparative negligence, that
test would only be a starting place with a determination of the
degree of involvement to follow. It would seem that even where
plaintiff's negligence is patent, unless the evidence of degree is
overwhelming, the courts will be extremely reticent to direct
a verdict against the plaintiff based on his negligent conduct
alone.
Comparative negligence should apply to all disputes arising
out of the claimed negligence of the parties where the issue of
contributory negligence is raised. The statute contemplates both
trials to the jury and the court. 101 An arbitration proceeding
would be handled in a manner similar to that of a trial to the
court. The arbitrator, as the trier of fact, would simply determine
the percentage of negligence on the part of the involved parties
and make his award accordingly.
It may be worth noting one specific situation wherein the
statute will probably have wide application. This is in the area
of auto accidents and the seatbelt defense. Recent emphasis on
automobile design safety has brought about correlative emphasis
upon the use of safety equipment in motor vehicles. Failure to
use available safety equipment, which would have prevented
or lessened the claimed injury, falls squarely within orthodox
100 Commercial Carriers, Inc. v. Driscoll Truck Lines, Inc., 158 Colo. 552,
101

408 P.2d 445 (1965); Nygren v. Dimond, 472 P.2d 169 (Colo. Ct App.
1970) (not selected for official publication).
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-2-14(2) (a) (Supp. 1971).
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definitions of contributory negligence and proximate cause.
Such neglect on the part of a claiming party, however, was
usually slight as compared with the conduct of the party causing the collision so that application of strict contributory negligence principles seemed unduly severe. As a result, many strict
contributory negligence states treated plaintiff's omission only
as a matter of "mitigation."

Comparative negligence eliminates the harshness and provides for mitigation so that failure to use an available safety
device may now be recognized for what it really is-simply another form of failure to exercise reasonable care. The seatbelt
defense as a type of comparative contributory negligence is wellrecognized in Wisconsin.' 03
CONCLUSION

The Colorado comparative negligence system, which incorporates the "less-than" rule, has retained the basic legal precept
that one should not recover if he is equally at fault, and yet has
allowed the harsh barriers of strict contributory negligence to
be lowered somewhat. In this manner the jury, as the proper
social and legal instrument of the community, may fairly measure
proportionate individual fault and assess damages as they are
proved by the evidence. When used with a special verdict procedure, comparative negligence" harnesses and directs the juror's
thought processes toward specific findings which are then implemented by the court. The system appears to be quite workable,
and seems to fairly compromise the interests of all parties. While
the adoption of comparative negligence will surely entail a period
of transition, experience in those states presently operating under
such a system indicates that it can be adopted with minimal disruption and change.

COLO. JURY INST. 9:15, 24, 26; Carlson v. Millisack, 82 Colo. 491, 261 P.
657 (1927); Deep Mining & Drainage Co. v. Fitzgerald, 21 Colo. 533, 43
P. 210 (1895). The injured party does not sue for the happening of an
accident; he sues for injury and claims that defendant proximately
caused the injury. If that injury was partly caused by the plaintiff's
own omission, his conduct falls within the definition of contributory
negligence. See Mays v. Dealers Transit, Inc., 441 F.2d 1344 (7th Cir.
1971).
103 Bentzler v. Braun, 34 Wis. 2d 362, 149 N.W.2d 626 (1967).
102
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APPENDIX

Order
WHEREAS, the Colorado Supreme Court Committee on Civil Jury Instructions has
formulated instructions concerning comparative negligence, necessitated by the enactment by the General Assembly of an Act Concerning Comparative Negligence As A Means
Of Ascertaining Damages in Negligence Cases, which amended Article 2 of Chapter 41 of
Colorado Revised Statutes, 1963, as amended, by the addition of a new section, C.R.S.
1963, 41-2-14, effective July 1, 1971, and
WHEREAS, this Court has considered the comparative negligence instructions and
notes on use prepared and submitted by the jury instructions committee for approval by
the Court, numbered as follow: 4:16, 4:17, 9:1, 9:16, 9:17, 9:18, 9:31, 9:32, 9:33,
9:34, 9:35, 9:36, 9:37, 10:1, 10:2 and 14:1,
NOW, THEREFORE, it isORDERED that the foregoing jury instructions and notes on
use are approved by this Court for use in jury trials in the State of Colorado, subject to
the following qualification.
These instructions are merely intended as guidelines. Since the comparative negligence
statute has not been tested in an adversary proceeding, the Supreme Court cannot pass
upon the propriety or necessity for other instructions, and corrections, or additions that
may necessarily have to be made in the future concerning these instructions. Until the
instructions are tested in an adversary proceeding, they are approved only in principle,
and shall be used where applicable in accordance with C.R.C.P. 51.1.
BY THE COURT, EN BANC, this 28 day of January, 1972.
Edward E. Pringle
Chief Justice
4:16 Special Verdict-Mechanics for Submitting
Notes on Use: Add as the first pa.agraph:
For the appropriate special verdict instruction to be used in comparative negligence
cases, see Instructions 9:32, 9:34 and 9:36.
4:17 Special Verdict Form
Notes on Use: Add as the first paragraph:
For the appropriate special verdict form to be used in comparative negligence cases, see
Instructions 9:33, 9:35 and 9:37.
9:1 Elements of Liability
Change last paragraph of instruction to read:
On the other hand, if you find all of these (number) propositions have been established
by a preponderance of the evidence, then your verdict must be for the plaintiff (unless
you should also find that the defendant's affirmative defense of [insert any affirmative
defense other than contributory negligence] has been established by a preponderance of
the evidence, in which event your verdict must be for the defendant).
Notes on Use: Change to read:
In actions arising out of events occurring prior to July 1, 1971, the former instruction
and Notes on Use are applicable. The present instruction and following Notes on Use
apply to actions arising out of events occurring on or after July 1, 1971.
Omit any numbered paragraphs, the facts of which are not in dispute.
Use whichever parenthesized words are most appropriate and omit the parenthesized
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clause of the last paragraph if the defendant has put no affirmative defense in issue or
there is insufficient evidence to support any defense.
Whenever the defense of contributory negligence has been properly raised, the
applicable comparative negligence instructions (see Instructions 9:31 through 9:37)
should be used rather than this instruction.
Other appropriate instructions defining the terms used in this instruction, e.g.,
Instruction 9:2, defining "negligence," must be given with this instruction.
This instruction should not be used when liability has been admitted (see Instruction
2:4) or when the court has directed a verdict as to liability (see Instruction 2:6).
Source and Authority: Change to read:
The basic elements of a negligence case are set out in Independent Lumber Co. v.
Leatherwood, 102 Colo. 460, 79 P.2d 1052 (1938). Also in general support of this
instruction, see Instructions approved in Folck v. Haser, 164 Colo. 11, 432 P.2d 245
(1967).
9:16 Negligence of Spouse as Bar to His Claim for Loss of Consortium or for Injuries to
Spouse
Instruction not to be used in actions arising out of events occurring on or after July 1,
1971.
Notes on Use: While the negligence of one spouse in proximately causing injuries to the
other spouse is a defense to the former's claim for loss of consortium, Prosser, Torts
§125, at 893-94 (4th ed. 1971), it is not necessarily a complete bar under C.R.S.
§41-2-14 (Colo. Laws 1971, ch. 125, section 1 at 496). For that reason the former
instruction should not be used in actions arising out of events occurring on or after July
1, 197 1. Instead the applicable comparative negligence instructions (see Instructions 9:31
through 9:37), appropriately modified, should be used.
9:17 Parents' Negligence as Bar to Parents' Claim for Injuries to Child
Instruction not to be used in actions arising out of events occurring on or after July 1,
1971.
Notes on Use: While the negligence of a parent in proximately causing injuries to his
child is a defense to that parent's claim for loss of services, expenses, etc. Prosser, Torts
§125, at 893-94 (4th ed. 1971), it is not necessarily a complete bar under C.R.S.
§41-2-14 (Colo. Laws 1971, ch. 125, section 1 at 496). For that reason the former
instruction should not be used in actions arising out of events occurring on or after July
1, 1971. Instead the applicable comparative negligence instructions (see Instructions 9:31
through 9:37), appropriately modified, should be used.
In the absence of some basis such as master and servant, the contributory negligence of
one parent in causing injuries to his child is not imputable to the other parent. See
Phillips v. Denver City Tramway Co., 53 Colo. 458, 128 Pac. 460 (1912).
9:18 Last Clear Chance
Instruction not to be used in actions arising out of events occurring on or after July 1,
1971.
Notes on Use: The applicable comparative negligence instructions (see Instructions
9:31 through 9:37), based on C.R.S. §41-2-14 (Colo. Laws 1971, ch. 125, section 1 at
496), should be used rather than the former instruction in actions arising out of events
occurring on or after July 1, 1971.
Source and A uthority: The doctrine of last clear chance is logically subsumed under a
comparative negligence statute such as Colorado's. Prosser, Torts § 67, at 438-39 nn 7 & 8
(4th ed. 1971 ). See also Heft & Heft, Comparative Negligence Manual § 1.220 (1971) and
2 Harper & James, Torts §22.14 (1956).
F. Comparative Negligence
9:31 Comparative Negligence -Elements
If you find the claimed damages were proximately caused by both the negligence of the
plaintiff, (name), and the defendant, (name), then you must determine to what extent

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 48

the negligent conduct of each contributed to the damages of the plaintiff, expressed as a
percentage of 100 percent.
Notes on Use: This instruction applies only in actions arising out of events occurring
on or after July 1, 1971. It must be given whenever Instructions 9:32 or 9:33 are given or
when, after it has been appropriately modified, Instructions 9:34 and 9:35 or
Instructions 9:36 and 9:37 are given.
This instruction should be appropriately modified in cases where the negligence of
another would be available as a defense to the plaintiff's claim, for example, the
negligence of a decedent in a wrongful death action; the negligence of a child in a suit by
a parent for medical expenses, etc.; the negligence of an injured spouse in a suit by the
other spouse for loss of consortium, or the negligence of an employee in a suit by an
employer against a third person who jointly with the servant negligently injured the
employer.
Source and Authority: This instruction is based on C.R.S. §41-2-14 (Colo. Laws 1971,
ch. 125, section 1 at 496).
9:32 Comparative Negligence-Special Verdict-Mechanics for Submitting-No Counterclaim-Single Defendant
The court instructs you to answer the following questions which present the ultimate
issues of fact in this case, and which will be on a form for Special Verdict:
1. Was the defendant, (name), negligent?
2. Was the defendant's negligence, if any, a proximate cause of the plaintiff's, (nme),
claimed (injuries) (damages) (losses)?
3. Was the plaintiff contributorily negligent?
4. Was the plaintiff's contributory negligence, if any, a proximate cause of (his) (her)
claimed (injuries) (damages) (losses)?
5. If you answer all the four foregoing questions "yes," then you are to answer this
question:
Taking the combined negligence that proximately caused the (injuries) (damages)
(losses) as 100 percent, what percentage of that negligence was attributable to the
defendant and what percentage was attributable to the plaintiff?
6. If you answer questions 1. and 2. "yes," then state the amount of damages, if any,
you find were sustained by the plaintiff and proximately caused by the (accident)
(occurrence), without regard to the contributory negligence of the plaintiff, if any.
[Insert any other questions which may be necessary to resolve properly any other
claims of the plaintiff or affirmative defenses of the defendant.]
Before you return the Special Verdict answering these questions, you must unanimously agree upon your answers to each question for which an answer is required. Upon
arriving at such agreement, the foreman will insert each such answer in the verdict and
then sign it, upon the completion of all such answers.
Notes on Use: This instruction is applicable only in actions arising out of events
occurring on or after July 1, 197 1.
Use whichever parenthesized words are most appropriate.
This instruction should be used "in any action by any person or his legal representative
to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or in injury to person or property"
and in which the defense of contributory negligence has been raised and sufficient
evidence presented to warrant submitting that issue to the jury.
Whenever this instruction is given, Instructions 9:31 and 9:33 must also be given as well
as such other instructions relating to negligence, contributory negligence, proximate
cause, damages, etc., as are appropriate to the case.
This instruction should be appropriately modified in cases where the negligence of
another would be available as a defense to the plaintiff's claim, for example, the
negligence of a decedent in a wrongful death action; the negligence of a child in a suit by
a parent for medical expenses, etc.; the negligence of an injured spouse in a suit by the
other spouse for loss of consortium; or the negligence of an employee in a suit by the
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employer against a third person who jointly with the employee negligently injured the
employer.
If, in a district court case, the parties have stipulated to a verdict or finding by some
stated majority, pursuant to C.R.C.P. 48 (Rev. 1970), this instruction should be modified
accordingly.
Source and Authority: This instruction is based on C.R.S. §41-2-14 (Colo. Laws 1971,
ch. 125, section 1 at 496).
To be effective as a defense, any contributory negligence must have been a proximate
cause of the claimed injuries or losses. Roberts v. Fisher, 169 Colo. 288, 455 P.2d 871
(1969); Matt Skorey Packard Co. v. Canino, 142 Colo. 411,350 P.2d 1069 (1960).
Contributory negligence is an affirmative defense on which the party asserting the
defense has the burden of pleading and the burden of proof. C.R.C.P. 8(c) (Rev. 1970);
Stevens v. Strauss, 147 Colo. 547, 364 P.2d 382 (1961) (citing earlier cases).
9:33 Comparative Negligence-Special Verdict Form-No Counterclaim
IN THE
COURT IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF_,
STATE OF COLORADO
Civil Action No.

Plaintiff,
SPECIAL VERDICT
V.

Defendant,

We, the jury, present our Answers to Questions submitted by the court, to which we
have unanimously agreed:
QUESTION NO. 1: Was the defendant, (name), negligent? (yes or no)
ANSWER NO. 1:
QUESTION NO. 2: Was the defendant's negligence, if any, a proximate cause of the
plaintiff's (name), claimed (injuries) (damages) (losses)? (yes or no)
ANSWER NO. 2:
QUESTION NO. 3: Was the plaintiff, (name), contributorily negligent? (yes or no)
ANSWER NO. 3:
QUESTION NO. 4: Was the plaintiff's contributory negligence, if any, a proximate
cause of (his) (her) claimed (injuries) (damages) (losses) (yes or no)
ANSWER NO. 4:
QUESTION NO. 5: If you have answered all the four foregoing questions "yes," then
you are to answer this question:
Taking the combined negligence that proximately caused the (injuries) (damages)
(losses) as 100 percent, what percentage of that negligence was attributable to the
defendant and what percentage was attributable to the plaintiff?
ANSWER NO. 5:
%
Percentage of combined negligence attributable to defendant, (name):
%
Percentage of combined negligence attributable to plaintiff, (name):
100%
Total:
QUESTION NO. 6: If you have answered Questions I and 2 "yes," state the amount of
damages, if any, sustained by the plaintiff and proximately caused by the (accident)
(occurrence), without regard to the contributory negligence of the plaintiff, if any?
ANSWER NO. 6: $
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[Insert any other questions and appropriate answer forms which may be necessary to
resolve properly any other claims of the plaintiff or affirmative defenses of the
defendant.]
Notes on Use: This instruction is to be used in conjunction with Instruction 9:32.
Notes on Use to Instruction 9:32 are also applicable to this instruction.
Source and Authority: See Source and Authority to Instruction 9:32.
9:34 Comparative Negligence-Special Verdict-Mechanics for Submitting-Counterclaim
The court instructs you to answer the following questions which present the
ultimate issues of fact in this case, and which will be on a form for special verdict.
1. Was the defendant, (name), negligent?
2. Was the defendant's negligence, if any, a proximate cause of the plaintiff's, (name),
claimed (injjiries) (damages) (losses)?
3. Was the defendant's negligence, if any, a proximate cause of (his) (her) own claimed
(injuries) (damages) (losses)?
4. Was the plaintiff, (name), negligent?
5. Was the plaintiff's negligence, if any, a proximate cause of the defendant's claimed
(injuries) (damages) (losses)?
6. Was the plaintiff's negligence, if any, a proximate cause of (his) (her) own claimed
(injuries) (damages) (losses)?
7. If you answer all the six foregoing questions "yes," or if you answer Question I and
either Questions 2 or 3 "yes" and also answer Question 4 and either Question 5 or 6
"yes," then you are to answer this question:
Taking the combined negligence that proximately caused (injuries) (damages) (losses) to
either or both the plaintiff and the defendant as 100 percent, what percentage of that
combined negligence was attributable to the defendant and what percentage was
attributable to the plaintiff?
8. If you answer Questions 1 and 2 "yes," then state the amount of damages, if any,
you find were sustained by the plaintiff and proximately caused by the (accident)
(occurrence), without regard to the negligence of the plaintiff, if any.
9. If you answer Questions 4 and 5 "yes," then state the amount of damages, if any,
you find were sustained by the defendant and proximately caused by the (accident)
(occurrence), without regard to the negligence of the defendant, if any.
[Insert any other questions which may be necessary to resolve properly any other
claims of the plaintiffor affirmative defenses of the defendant. ]
Before you return the Special Verdict answering these questions, you must unanimously agree upon your answers to each question for which an answer is required. Upon
arriving at such agreement, the foreman will insert each such answer in the verdict and
then sign it, upon the completion of all such answers.
Notes on Use: This instruction is applicable only in actions arising out of events
occurring on or after July 1, 197 1.
Use whichever parenthesized words are most appropriate.
This instruction should be used "in any action by any person or his legal representative
to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or in injury to person or property"
and in which the defense of contributory negligence has been raised as a counterclaim and
sufficient evidence presented to warrant submitting that issue to the jury.
Whenever this instruction is given, Instruction 9:31, appropriately modified, and
Instruction 9:35 should also be given as well as such other instructions relating to
negligence, proximate cause, damages, etc., as are appropriate to the case.
This instruction should be appropriately modified when the alleged negligence
constituting the basis of the plaintiff's claim or the defendant's counterclaim is that of a
third person imputable to the defendant or the plaintiff. Similarly appropriate
modifications should be made when the defendant has alleged the personal negligence of
the plaintiff as the basis for the counterclaim and, separately, the negligence of a third
person as a defense to the plaintiff's claim, for example, a suit by a parent for medical
expenses for injuries to his child in which the defendant has claimed damages based on
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the negligence of the parent in causing the accident and, separately, the contributory
negligence of the child in also causing the accident.
If, in a district court case, the parties have stipulated to a verdict or finding by some
stated majority, pursuant to C.R.C.P. 48 (Rev. 1970), this instruction should be modified
accordingly.
Source and Authority: In addition to the Source and Authority to Instruction 9:32,
see C.R.C.P. 13 (Rev. 1970).
9:35 Comparative Negligence-Special Verdict Form-Counterclaim
IN THE-COURT IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF_, STATE OF COLORADO
Civil Action No.

Plaintiff,
SPECIAL VERDICT
V.

Defendant,

We, the jury, present our Answers to Questions submitted by the court to which we
have unanimously agreed:
QUESTION NO. 1: Was the defendant, (name), negligent? (yes or no)
ANSWER NO. I:
QUESTION NO. 2: Was the defendant's negligence, if any, a proximate cause of the
plaintiff's, (name), claimed (injuries) (damages) (losses)? (yes or no)
ANSWER NO. 2:
QUESTION NO. 3: Was the defendant's negligence, if any, a proximate cause of (his)
(her) own claimed (injuries) (damages) (losses)? (yes or no)
ANSWER NO. 3:
QUESTION NO. 4: Was the plaintiff, (name), negligent? (yes or no)
ANSWER NO. 4:
QUESTION NO. 5: Was the plaintiff's negligence, if any, a proximate cause of the
defendant's claimed (injuries) (damages) (losses)? (yes or no)
ANSWER NO. 5:
QUESTION NO. 6: Was the plaintiff's negligence, if any, a proximate cause of (his)
(her) own claimed (injuries) (damages) (losses)? (yes or no)
ANSWER NO. 6:
QUESTION NO. 7: If you have answered all the six foregoing questions "yes," or if
you have answered Question I and either Question 2 or 3 "yes," and you have also
answered Question 4 and either Question 5 or 6 "yes," then you are to answer this
question:
Taking the combined negligence that proximately caused (injuries) (damages) (loss) to
either or both the plaintiff and the defendant as 100 percent, what percentage of that
combined negligence was attributable to the defendant and what percentage was
attributable to the plaintiff?
ANSWER NO. 7:
Percentage of combined negligence attributable to the defendant, (name):
-%
Percentage of combined negligence attributable to the plaintiff, (name):
100%
Total :
QUESTION NO. 8: If you have answered Questions I and 2 "yes," state the amount of
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damages, if any, you find were sustained by the plaintiff and proximately caused by the
(accident) (occurrence), without regard to the negligence of the plaintiff, if any?
ANSWER NO. 8: $__
QUESTION NO. 9: If you have answered questions 4 and 5 "yes," state the amount of
damages, if any, you find were sustained by the defendant and proximately caused by the
(accident) (occurrence), without regard to the negligence of the defendant, if any.
ANSWER NO. 9: $
[Insert any other questions and appropriate answer forms which may be necessary to
resolve properly any other claims of the plaintiff or affirmative defenses of the
defendant.]
Foreman
Notes on Use: This instruction is to be used in conjunction with Instruction 9:34. The
Notes on Use to Instruction 9:34 are also applicable to this instruction.
Source and Authority: See Source and Authority to Instructions 9:32 and 9:34.
9:36 Comparative Negligence-Special Verdict-Mechanics for Submitting-Multiple Defendants
The court instructs you to answer the following questions which present the ultimate
issues of fact in this case, and which will be on a form for Special Verdict.
1. Was the defendant, (name of first defendant), negligent?
2. Was the defendant's, (same name), negligence, if any, a proximate cause of the
plaintiff's, (name), claimed (injuries) (damages) (losses)?
3. Was the defendant, (name of second defendant), negligent?
4. Was the defendant's, (same name), negligence, if any, a proximate cause of the
plaintiff's claimed (injuries) (damages) (losses)?
5. Was the plaintiff contributorily negligent?
6. Was the plaintiff's contributory negligence, if any, a proximate cause of (his) (her)
claimed (injuries) (damages) (losses)?
7. If you answer all the six foregoing questions "yes," or if you answer questions I and
2 or questions 3 and 4 "yes" and also answer questions 5 and 6 "yes," then you are to
answer this question:
Taking as 100 percent the combined negligence of those parties whom you may have
found to be negligent and whose negligence you may have found was a proximate cause
of the plaintiff's claimed (injuries) (damages) (losses), what percentage of that combined
negligence was attributable to defendant, (name of first defendant), if any; what
percentage was attributable to the defendant, (name of second defendant), if any, and
what percentage was attributable to the plaintiff (name)?
8. If you answer questions 1 and 2 "yes" or questions 3 and 4 "yes," then state the
amount of damages, if any, you find were sustained by the plaintiff and proximately
caused by the (accident) (occurrence), without regard to the contributory negligence of
the plaintiff, if any.
[Insert any other questions which may be necessary to resolve properly any other
claims of the plaintiff or affirmative defenses of either of the defendants. ]
Before you return the Special Verdict answering these questions, you must unanimously agree upon your answers to each question for which an answer is required. Upon
arriving at such agreement, the foreman will insert each such answer in the verdict and
then sign it, upon the completion of all such answers.
Notes on Use: This instruction is applicable only in actions arising out of events
occurring on or after July 1, 1971.
Use whichever parenthesized words are most appropriate.
This instruction should be used "in any action by any person or his legal representative
to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or in injury to person or property,"
in which the defense of contributory negligence has been raised and there is sufficient
evidence presented to warrant submitting that issue to the jury, and in which the
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defendants would each be liable as joint tortfeasors, if at all, for all the damages claimed
by the plaintiff. If one defendant might be liable for having negligently and proximately
caused all the plaintiff's injuries, while the other defendant might be liable only for a part
of such injuries, this instruction must be appropriately modified.
Whenever this instruction is given, Instruction 9:31, appropriately modified, and
Instruction 9:37 should also be given as well as such other instructions relating to
negligence, contributory negligence, proximate cause, damages, etc., as are appropriate to
the case.
This instruction should also be appropriately modified in cases where the negligence of
another would be available as a defense to the plaintiff's claim, for example, the
negligence of a decedent in a wrongful death action; the negligence of a child in a suit by
a parent for medical expenses, etc.; the negligence of an injured spouse in a suit by the
other spouse for loss of consortium; or the negligence of an employee in a suit by the
employer against a third person who jointly with the employee negligently injured the
employer.
If, in a district court case, parties have stipulated to a verdict or finding by some stated
majority, pursuant to C.R.C.P. 48 (Rev. 1970), this instruction should be modified
accordingly.
Source and Authority: See Source and Authority to Instruction 9:32.
9:37 Comparative Negligence-Special Verdict Form-Multiple Defendants
IN THE-COURT IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF __, STATE OF COLORADO
Civil Action No.

Plaintiff,
SPECIAL

VERDICT

V.

Defendant,
We, the jury, present our Answers to Questions submitted by the court, to which we
have unanimously agreed:
QUESTION NO. 1: Was the defendant, (name of first defendant), negligent (yes or no)
ANSWER NO. 1:
QUESTION NO. 2: Was the defendant's, (same name), negligence, if any, a proximate
cause of the plaintiff's, (name), claimed (injuries) (damages) (losses)? (yes or no)
ANSWER NO. 2:
QUESTION NO. 3: Was the defendant, (name of second defendant), negligent? (yes or
no)
ANSWER NO. 3:
QUESTION NO. 4: Was the defendant's (same name), negligence, if any, a proximate
cause of the plaintiff's (name), claimed (injuries) (damages) (losses)? (yes or no)
ANSWER NO. 4:
QUESTION NO. 5: Was the plaintiff, (name), contributorily negligent? (yes or no)
ANSWER NO. 5:
QUESTION NO. 6: Was the plaintiff's contributory negligence, if any, a proximate
cause of (his) (her) claimed (injuries) (damages) (losses)? (yes or no)
ANSWER NO. 6:
QUESTION NO. 7: If you have answered all six foregoing questions "yes," or if you
have answered questions I and 2 or questions 3 and 4 "yes" and you have also answered
questions 5 and 6 "yes," then you are to answer this question:
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Taking as 100 percent the combined negligence of those parties whom you found to be
negligent and whose negligence you found was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's
claimed (injuries) (damages) (losses), what percentage of that negligence was attributable
to the defendant, (name of first defendant), if any; what percentage was attributable to
the defendant, (name of second defendant), if any, and what percentage was attributable
to the plaintiff?
ANSWER NO. 7:
Percentage, if any, of combined negligence attributable to defendant,
(name of first defendant):
Percentage, if any, of combined negligence, attributable to defendant,
-%
(name of second defendant):
Percentage of combined negligence attributable to plaintiff, (name):
100%
Total :
QUESTION NO. 8: If you have answered questions I and 2 "yes" or questions 3 and 4
"yes," state the amount of damages, if any, sustained by the plaintiff and proximately
caused by the (accident) (occurrence), without regard to the contributory negligence of
the plaintiff, if any?
ANSWER NO. 8: $
[Insert any other questions and appropriate answer forms which may be necessary to
resolve properly any other claims of the plaintiff or affirmative defenses of either of the
defendants.]
Foreman
Notes on Use: This instruction is to be used in conjunction with Instruction 9:36.
Notes on Use to Instruction 9:36 are also applicable to this instruction.
Source and Authority: See Source and Authority to Instruction 9:32.
10:1 Contributory Negligence of Decedent
Instruction not to be used in actions arising out of events occurring on or after July 1,
1971.
Notes on Use: While the contributory negligence of a decedent is a defense in a
wrongful death action, Willy v. Atchison, T.&S.F. Ry., 115 Colo. 306, 172 P.2d 958
(1946) (construing what is now C.R.S. §41-1-2 (1963)); Restatement 2d, Torts §494
(1965), and Prosser, Torts §127, at 910 (4th ed. 1971), it is not necessarily a complete
bar under C.R.S. §41-2-14 (Colo. Laws 1971, ch. 125, section 1 at 496). For that reason,
the former instruction should not be used in actions arising out of events occurring on or
after July 1, 1971. Instead the applicable comparative negligence instructions (see
Instructions 9:31 through 9:37), appropriately modified, should be used.
Source and Authority: See sources and authority above.
10:2 Contributory Negligence of a Plaintiff
Instruction not to be used in actions arising out of events occurring on or after July 1,
1971.
Notes on Use; While the contributory negligence of a plaintiff is a defense in a
wrongful death action as to that plaintiff's claim, Phillips v. Denver City Tramway Co., 53
Colo. 458, 128 Pac. 460 (1912); Prosser, Torts § 127, at 913 (4th ed. 1971), it is not
necessarily a complete bar under C.R.S. §41-2-14 (Colo. Laws 1971, ch. 125, section I at
496). For that reason, the former instruction should not be used in actions arising out of
events occurring on or after July 1, 1971. Instead the applicable comparative negligence
instructions (see Instructions 9:31 through 9:37), appropriately modified, if necessary,
should be used.
Source and A uthority: See sources and authority above.
14:1 Manufacturer's Liability Based on Negligence -Elements of Liability
Notes on Use; Add as first paragraph:
In actions arising out of events occurring on or after July 1, 1971, in which the defense
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of contributory negligence has been properly raised, the applicable comparative
negligence instructions (see Instructions 9:31 through 9:37), appropriately modified,
should be used rather than this instruction.

